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Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute, The Hague;
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands
In this article, the authors examine effects of partners’ attitudes on the timing
of the birth of a first child, the division of domestic labor, the division of child
care, and the division of paid labor of couples. They use data from the Panel
Study of Social Integration in the Netherlands, which includes independent
measures of both partners’ attitudes in one wave (1995) and family life
behavior in the next wave (1999). Using theories about decision rules, the
authors formulate hypotheses about possible outcomes when partners have
dissimilar attitudes. The results show that partners’ attitudes are not always
identical. Most important, attitudes of both partners are found to be equally
important in joint decisions.
Keywords: attitudes; partners; childbirth; division of labor
Attitudes and values concerning family life show a long-term trendtoward greater gender equality, more individual autonomy, and increas-
ing acceptance of labor force participation of wives and mothers, both in
the United States and in Europe (Lesthaeghe, 1995; Thornton & Young-
DeMarco, 2001). This trend has coincided with similar changes in family
life itself.
These macro trends have sparked discussion about the causal mecha-
nisms linking these two processes. Are changes in values and attitudes
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resulting in behavioral changes? Is behavioral change resulting in changes
in values and attitudes? Are both processes operating simultaneously, or is
a third factor—for instance, economic development—influencing both
processes (Lesthaeghe & Moors, 2002)?
Microlevel studies that examine the impact of attitudes and values on
family life behaviors and vice versa have made an important contribution to
answering these questions. These studies show that both processes—termed
value selection and value adaptation, respectively—are operative at the same
time (e.g., Axinn & Thornton, 1993, 1996; Moors, 2002; Thornton, Alwin, &
Camburn, 1983). Particularly well-documented is the impact of attitudes and
values on the family life course and the organization of daily life. For instance,
women with more traditional gender role attitudes are more likely to enter into
a marriage and are more likely to do so at an early age than women with egal-
itarian gender role attitudes (Barber & Axinn, 1998; Clarkberg, Stolzenberg, &
Waite, 1995; Moors, 1997; Smith-Lovin & Tickamyer, 1978; Thornton et al.,
1983). Negative effects of egalitarian gender role attitudes on the timing of
childbirth and the number of children have also been reported (Thornton et al.,
1983). Furthermore, egalitarian gender role attitudes of women and men have
been shown to lead to an increasing contribution of men to household and car-
ing tasks (Jansen & Kalmijn, 2002). In addition, other types of attitudes, such
as attitudes toward having children, have also been reported to influence
family behaviors. For instance, positive parenthood attitudes lead to having
children at an earlier age (Beets, Liefbroer, & De Jong Gierveld, 1999).
An important limitation of nearly all studies on the impact of attitudes and
values on family life behavior is the fact that they only pay attention to the influ-
ence of attitudes of one of the partners—generally the wife. However, most
family life decisions have consequences for both partners and, therefore, it
seems natural that attitudes of both partners play a role in these decisions. After
all, choices concerning the timing of childbirth and the division of household
chores, child care, and paid labor are usually taken jointly by a couple.
The focus of most studies on the values and attitudes of just one partner
would be justified if partners hold similar values and attitudes. Indeed, theories
on mate selection and homogamy suggest that partners often hold similar atti-
tudes because they partly select one another on corresponding values (Kalmijn,
1991, 1998; Krishnan, 1993; Thomson, 1990). In addition, partners’ attitudes
and values may grow more alike with time as a result of shared experience
(Aube & Koestner, 1995). However, it seems highly unlikely that partners
will always completely agree in their values and attitudes (Social and Cultural
Planning Office, 2000). Therefore, if disagreements on these issues occur, the
question arises how partners will handle these differences in attitudes and
1488 Journal of Family Issues
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values and whether such differences lead to compromises or to a dominance of
attitudes of one of the partners. Hence, this study focuses on the influence of
attitudes of both partners on family life decisions. In particular, we will exam-
ine the impact of gender role attitudes and attitudes toward having children on
decisions with regard to the division of household and child care tasks, labor
force participation of women, and the timing of parenthood.
Research Background
The number of studies that have addressed the impact of values, attitudes,
and other subjective evaluations of both partners on joint decision making
is limited. Among studies that do focus on differences in effects of husbands’
and wives’ attitudes, most concentrate on their effects on marital quality or
marital conflict. The study of Amato and Booth (1995) shows opposite effects
of egalitarian gender role attitudes on reported marital quality for husbands
and wives. When wives’ gender role attitudes become less traditional, their
perceived marital quality declines; but when husbands become more modern,
their perceived marital quality increases. However, the husbands and wives in
the study by Amato and Booth are not married to one another, so they were
not able to examine effects of attitudes of spouses simultaneously. McHale
and Crouter (1992) show that within couples, spouses who experience incon-
gruence between their gender role attitudes and family work evaluate their
marriage more negatively than spouses who experience less incongruence.
Kluwer, Heesink, and Van de Vliert (1997) show that for the Netherlands, the
spouses’ gender role attitudes influence their conflict interaction patterns
about the division of labor. Traditional wives and wives with traditional hus-
bands tend to avoid conflicts during negotiations about the division of labor.
The direct relationship between couples’ gender role attitudes and behav-
ioral decisions has been examined by Greenstein (1996), using cross-sectional
data from the National Survey of Family and Households. Husbands’ contri-
bution to domestic labor decreases as gender role attitudes of husbands
become more traditional. However, this effect is found for men married to
egalitarian women only. For men married to traditional women, no effect of
husbands’ attitudes is found. Thomson (2002) addresses the impact of family
attitudes on actual decision making in another field. She examines whether
gender role traditionalism, sexual conservatism, and conjugal and extended
familism influence the timing of childbirth. She reports that the impact of the
values of both partners are additive. The type of attitudes that influence the
timing of a first child differs between women and men, however. The timing
Jansen, Liefbroer / Childbirth and Division of Labor 1489
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is influenced by the level of conjugal familism and extended familism of the
wife but by the level of extended familism of the husband.
Some studies do not focus on attitudes but address the impact of other types
of subjective evaluations on joint decisions. Many of these studies are about
the role of child intentions and desires of couples on parenthood decisions
(Coombs & Chang, 1981; Morgan, 1985; Thomson, 1997; Thomson & Hoem,
1998; Thomson, McDonald, & Bumpass, 1990). Results of these studies show
that a lack of agreement between partners in their desire for children or in their
intentions to have children exerts a strong effect on the timing of childbirth.
Couples who completely disagree about having children actually have children
at a later age than couples in which both partners share a strong desire for
children. However, couples who disagree still have children at an earlier age
than couples with no intention or desire for children. Furthermore, these stud-
ies show that in case of disagreement between partners, both husbands and
wives exert equal influence on the outcome. No evidence is found for a domi-
nance of the desires or intentions of one of the partners.
Theory
To understand what will happen to family decisions if partners hold
diverging attitudes, it is useful to focus on the kind of heuristics or decision
rules that partners use in resolving conflicts (Corijn, Liefbroer, & De Jong
Gierveld, 1996; Scanzoni & Szinovacs, 1980; Thomson, 1990). The heuris-
tic used will have consequences for the importance attached to the attitudes
of each of the partners. Based on existing literature, at least four decision
heuristics can be distinguished.
A first heuristic that partners may use in dealing with diverging attitudes is
based on the literature on power relationships within unions and suggests that
the attitudes of the most powerful partner will be decisive in decision-making
processes (McDonald, 1980). Generally, relative power within a relationship
is determined by the socioeconomic resources (education, occupational status,
income) available to spouses. If a spouse has easy access to these resources,
he or she is less dependent on the relationship, because he or she can cope out-
side the relationship. Therefore, according to the power rule, the more access
a partner has to scarce resources, the more power this spouse holds and the
more likely it is that this spouse’s attitudes will prevail in decision making. A
concrete example is given by Sorenson (1989). She showed that for Hispanics,
the influence of the wife on the final family size increases when she gets more
educated and therefore has better chances on the labor market. A special
1490 Journal of Family Issues
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version of this rule is the patriarchal rule. This rule states that husbands win all
or most of the time at disagreements. We consider this to be a variant of the
power rule, because this heuristic is based on the assumption that husbands are
usually the ones with the most resources within a relationship.
A second heuristic is based on the assumption that spouses view each
other as equals and that this notion of equality permeates all domains of
family life. The corresponding decision rule is that partners view each
other’s attitudes as equally important and try to strike a compromise if they
hold diverging opinions. The result of such a strategy will be that the deci-
sion will be midway between the preferences of both partners. For instance,
if one partner prefers an egalitarian division of labor and the other partner a
traditional, gender-specific division of labor, the actual division of labor will
end up somewhere in between. Probably the wife will still do most of the
homework and the husband will do most of the paid labor, but the other part-
ner will also contribute, though to a lesser extent, to the labor within both
these domains. Studies on intentions of couples toward childbearing assert
that if they differ in their child-number or child-timing intentions, couples
often try to strike a compromise (Thomson, 1997; Thomson & Hoem, 1998;
Thomson et al., 1990). We call this the “golden mean” hypothesis.
A third heuristic that spouses could use is based on traditional ideas about
a gender-specific division of household and paid labor. The New Home
Economics Theory (Becker, 1981) provides a theoretical rationale for a
gender-specific division of labor in which the wife focuses on family and
children and the husband focuses on paid employment. Thomson (1990)
bases her sphere of interest rule on this traditional model of family life.
According to this heuristic, wives’ attitudes will dominate in decision mak-
ing within her sphere of interest, whereas husbands’ attitudes will dominate
if decisions have to be taken in his sphere of interest. According to Thomson
(1990), this heuristic offers researchers a rationale not to include information
on husbands’ goals and attitudes in studies on fertility and child rearing. This
sphere of interest rule can also be considered as a special instance of the
power rule. According to Scanzoni and Szinovacs (1980), power is a situa-
tional good. As a result of specialization, wives usually have a larger say in
household issues and husbands in labor market issues, leading to a situation
in which both partners wield power in their own sphere of interest.
All the heuristics discussed so far imply that partners, in one way or
another, arrive at a joint decision. However, there is yet another possibility
that can occur when couples have dissimilar values. The interaction
between partners with conflicting values could lead to the postponement of
decisions. This decision rule is called the “social drift rule” (Neal & Groat,
Jansen, Liefbroer / Childbirth and Division of Labor 1491
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1980; Thomson, 1990). Because of conflicting thoughts on decisions, the
confrontation on joint decisions could systematically be avoided and deci-
sion making could be postponed. Disagreement will be resolved by doing
nothing, leading to the continuation of the existing status quo.
Hypotheses
Decisions on family-related issues such as the division of household labor
or having children are usually not based on static agreements between
spouses but part of a dynamic process of negotiation taking place during
an extended period of time (Greenstein, 1996; Kluwer et al., 1997; Pittman,
Solheim, & Blanchard, 1996). Although most partners eventually reach a
more or less satisfying agreement, this will only come at the cost of much
conflict and negotiation among couples who hold contradictory attitudes
(Kluwer et al., 1997). Which partner’s attitudes will prevail? The decision
rules outlined in the previous section imply different answers to this question.
The power rule suggests that the attitudes of the most powerful partner will
prevail. Although the educational level of women has risen in recent years,
husbands generally still have a higher occupational level and higher income
than wives do (Blossfeld & Drobnicˇ, 2001; Gornick & Jacobs, 1998). This
implies that the average bargaining position of husbands is stronger than that
of wives. Therefore, we hypothesize that if the power rule applies, the atti-
tudes of husbands will have a stronger effect on the decisions made within a
couple than the attitudes of wives. This is expected to hold true with regard
to all types of decisions to be made, be it the division of household labor and
child care, the division of paid employment, or the timing of childbirth.
The golden mean heuristic implies that partners will attach equal impor-
tance to the opinions of each of them. Therefore, based on this decision rule,
it can be hypothesized that the effect of the attitudes of wives and husbands
on family decisions will be equal. By using the golden mean rule, spouses
practice a process of negotiation that gives them the opportunity to work out
their differences. Defending one’s own interest through bargaining can facil-
itate the reconciliation of spouses’ interests, which will lead to a synthesis of
both positions (Kluwer et al., 1997). As in the case of the power rule, this is
expected to hold true with regard to all types of family decisions to be made.
The two previous rules expect that attitudes have the same effect, irrespec-
tive of the family decision under consideration. This is clearly different with
regard to the sphere of interest rule. This rule implies that the attitudes of the
partner in whose sphere of interest a decision is located will be dominant.
1492 Journal of Family Issues
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Given that household and child-rearing decisions are thought to belong to the
sphere of interest of the wife and labor force decisions to the sphere of inter-
est of the husband (Thomson, 1990), we hypothesize that attitudes of wives
will have a stronger effect on decisions about the division of household labor
and child-rearing tasks and about having children, whereas the attitudes of
husbands will have a stronger effect on decisions about paid employment.
The final heuristic discussed above is the social drift rule. This rule implies
that if partners disagree, they postpone decisions and the status quo is contin-
ued. We hypothesize that if the social drift rule applies, couples with diverg-
ing attitudes will postpone (additional) childbearing. Continuation of the
status quo with regard to the division of labor will, for most couples, imply
the continuation of or retreat to relatively traditional, gendered, behavioral
patterns. Therefore, we expect that if the social drift rule applies, couples will
adhere to a division of labor that reflects traditional gender roles.
In Table 1, a summary of the different decision rules and their hypothe-
sized consequences is presented.
Data and Method
Data
The data come from the Panel Study on Social Integration in the
Netherlands. In 1987, 1,775 young adults born in 1961, 1965, and 1969
were interviewed (using face-to-face and self-administered questionnaires).
The second wave of data collection was conducted in 1989 (mail question-
naire). A third wave of interviews was held in 1991, and the fourth wave was
conducted in 1995 (both face-to-face and self-administered questionnaires).
The last wave of data collection took place in 1999 (telephone and self-
administered questionnaires). The respondents were approximately 18, 22,
and 26 at the time of the first survey wave in 1987, and were approximately
30, 34, and 38 years of age in 1999. Of the respondents of the 1987 round,
47% were re-interviewed in 1999 (N = 836). In the 1995 wave, partners of
the respondents were also interviewed. Because this study focuses on cou-
ples, the analysis is restricted to respondents whose partner was interviewed
in 1995 and who still lived with the same partner in 1999 (N = 392).
Dependent Variables
Both in 1995 and in 1999, respondents were asked how the following five
household tasks were divided among partners: cooking, tidying up, doing the
Jansen, Liefbroer / Childbirth and Division of Labor 1493
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laundry, cleaning, and shopping. Respondents could choose among seven
answering categories, varying from (1) solely done by me to (7) solely done
by partner. For male respondents, the answering categories were reversed.
Mokken scale analysis (Mokken, 1971) was used to construct a scale out
of the five items. The analysis showed that the scale is reliable (H = 0.36,
p = .70). The resulting scale runs from (0) no contribution of the husband to
household labor to (10) no contribution of the wife to household labor.
With regard to the division of child care, respondents were asked in
1999, “Who performs daily care activities, like taking to bed, washing, and
dressing the child?” Again, respondents could choose among seven answer-
ing categories varying from (1) solely done by me to (7) solely done by part-
ner. For male respondents, the answering categories were reversed, so the
resulting scale runs from (1) solely done by the wife to (7) solely done by
the husband.
Both in 1995 and 1999, the wives were asked about their number of
working hours per week of the current paid job. The maximum number of
working hours could be 40 hours per week.
1494 Journal of Family Issues
Table 1
Overview of Decision Rules and Hypotheses
Decision Heuristic Mechanism Hypothesis
Power rule Access to social and economic Attitudes of the husband are
resources determine influence dominant with regard to all
family life decisions
Golden mean rule Partners have equal influence Attitudes of both partners are
in negotiations equally important with regard
to all family life decisions
Sphere of Traditional gender ideology Attitudes of the husband are
interest rule determines influence dominant with regard to
decisions on labor market
participation; attitudes of the
wife are dominant with regard
to decisions on household and
caring tasks and childbirth
Social drift rule Disagreement leads to The stronger the divergence in
continuation of the attitudes between spouses, the
status quo more traditional the division
of labor will be and the more
childbirth will be postponed
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Finally, information on the full fertility history was used to ascertain
whether a first child was born to the couple between 1995 and 1999, and if
so, at what time.
Attitudes
Gender role attitudes are measured with a scale based on four normative
statements to which respondents had to respond in a self-administered ques-
tionnaire. The partner of the respondent responded to the same statements in a
separate questionnaire. The statements are the following: (a) “it is normal for a
girl to attend technical vocational school,” (b) “it is unnatural for men to have
a female supervisor at work,” (c) “a woman is better suited for child rearing
than a man,” and (d) “it is most natural if the man is the breadwinner and the
woman takes care of the home and the children.” The answers vary from
(1) totally disagree to (5) totally agree. After reversing the scores for items b
through d, a scale was constructed out of these four items. Mokken analysis
showed that the items formed an acceptable scale, with H coefficients of 0.38
(p = .68) for males and 0.37 (p = .65) for females. The scores on this scale could
vary from (0) gender specific attitudes to (10) egalitarian attitudes. Table 2
shows that wives, on average, hold somewhat more egalitarian gender role atti-
tudes than husbands. Still, in one out of every three couples, the husband holds
more egalitarian gender attitudes than the wife (data not shown).
Attitudes toward parenthood are measured with five statements included
in the self-administered questionnaire. These statements come from the
Values of Children Study (Arnold et al., 1975). The statements are the fol-
lowing: (a) “I like to have children around me,” (b) “I think that in a modern
world, one can only feel comfortable and happy in one’s own family with
children,” (c) “I think you can be completely satisfied with your life when
you have been a good mother or father,” (d) “I like to have children, because
children really need you,” and (e) “I think it is a civil duty to have children.”
The answers vary from (1) totally disagree to (5) totally agree. Again, a
scale is constructed out of these items. Mokken scale analysis showed that
the scale is acceptable, with H coefficients of 0.37 for both males and
females (p = .69 for males and p = .70 for females). The scale scores could
vary from (0) not child oriented to (10) very child oriented. Table 2 shows
that on average, husbands and wives are equally child oriented. In one third
of the couples, the husband is more child oriented than the wife, whereas the
wife is more child oriented in another one third of the couples. In the remain-
ing one third of the couples, the spouses are equally child oriented (data not
shown).
Jansen, Liefbroer / Childbirth and Division of Labor 1495
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Table 2
Descriptive Information on Variables Used in the Analyses, for
Couples Who Did and Couples Who Did Not Participate in 1999
Mean for Mean for Couples
Couples Who Who Did Not
Participated Participate
Range in 1999 (N = 392) in 1999 (N = 163)
Dependent variables
Contribution husband to 0 to 10 2.93
household tasks in 1999
Contribution husband to caring 1 to 7 3.06
tasks in 1999
Hours paid labor wife in 1999 0 to 40 16.78
Childbirth between 1995 and 1999 0 to 1 0.52a
Attitudes (independent variables)
Egalitarian gender role attitude 0 to 10 8.40 8.40
wife in 1995
Egalitarian gender role attitude 0 to 10 7.81 7.76
husband in 1995
Child-oriented attitude wife 0 to 10 4.87 4.80
in 1995
Child-oriented attitude husband 0 to 10 4.84 4.53*
in 1995
Control variables
Contribution husband to 0 to 10 2.77 2.91
household tasks in 1995
Hours paid labor wife in 1995 0 to 40 20.54 21.40
Hours paid labor husband in 1995 0 to 40 36.83 35.07
Educational level wife in 1999 0 to 11 5.89
Educational level husband in 1999 0 to 11 5.91
Number of children in 1995 0 to 5 1.07 0.84*
Number of children in 1999 0 to 5 1.68
Cohort 61 to 69 63.87 64.85*
Hours paid labor husband in 1999
Married in 1999 0 to 1 0.90
Union duration in 1999 (in years) 3 to 20 11.72
Sex respondent (0 = Female, 0 to 1 0.48 0.48
1 = Male)
Percentage change in 1995 Increase Decrease
and 1999 
Contribution husband to 46.9 39.8
household tasks
Hours of paid labor by wife 26.8 45.9
a. This percentage is based on couples who were childless in 1995 only (N = 154).
*p < .05.
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Control Variables
Evidently, choices of couples are not only determined by their attitudes.
Therefore, we control for other possible determinants of joint decisions in our
models. Specifically, we control for the educational level of both partners,
their working hours, the birth of any children, the number of children, mari-
tal status, union duration, and birth cohort. Educational level is measured
by the number of years it takes to complete the highest level of education
attained by the respondent. The number of working hours is based on reports
of respondents on the number of hours they spent in paid labor. Childbirth is
a dummy variable indicating whether a child was born between the two sub-
sequent waves of the panel study. Depending on the specific analysis, the
number of children measures the number of children living with the couple
in either 1995 or 1999. Marital status is a dummy variable indicating whether
the couple is married. Union duration measures the length of time a couple
has been living together in years. Cohort is a variable taking the value 0 if
respondents are born in 1961, 1 if respondents are born in 1965, and 2 if
respondents are born in 1969. All joint decisions in 1999 are reported by one
of the partners, the key respondent. Therefore, we included a variable indi-
cating the gender of the key respondent in the analyses. By doing so, we con-
trol for possible differences in reporting for men and women.
To measure the causal effect of attitudes on behavior, the effect of attitudes
measured in 1995 on behavior occurring between 1995 and 1999 was esti-
mated, controlling for the initial behavior of a couple in 1995, namely, for the
division of household tasks in 1995, the number of working hours of the wife
in 1995, and the number of children in 1995. By controlling for the initial
behavior, we make sure that effects of attitudes on behavior in 1999 are not
spurious (because attitudes themselves may have been influenced by earlier
behavior). As a result, we actually estimate the influence of attitudes on behav-
ioral changes between 1995 and 1999 (Finkel, 1995). Unfortunately, in the
analysis of the division of child-caring tasks, we cannot control for the divi-
sion of child-caring tasks in 1995, as some couples were still childless in 1995.
As a result, the effects of attitudes on the division on child-caring tasks remain
susceptible to the spuriousness problem outlined above. In Table 2, we present
the range and the mean of the dependent and independent variables.
Panel Attrition
In a panel survey, selective attrition constitutes a serious problem
(Menard, 1991). In this study, selective attrition may occur in two ways.
First, the set of individual respondents interviewed in 1999 may differ from
Jansen, Liefbroer / Childbirth and Division of Labor 1497
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the set of respondents interviewed at the start of the panel in 1987. Second,
the set of couples of whom one of the partners was interviewed in 1999 may
differ from the set of couples interviewed in 1995 (the year that serves as a
baseline for our analyses). We pay attention to both types of attrition.
Selective individual attrition was assessed by drawing a comparison
between characteristics of all individuals who participated in the first wave of
the panel in 1987 and characteristics of individuals who still participated in
1999. Partner characteristics cannot be compared for these two groups, as
most respondents were not yet living with a partner in 1987. Important for
this study is that respondents who still participate in the panel in 1999 hold
more egalitarian gender attitudes (7.6 vs. 7.1; p < .01) and hold less favorable
parenthood attitudes (3.8 vs. 4.2; p < .01) than respondents who dropped out
before 1999. However, in a multivariate analysis predicting dropout before
1999 that includes 28 predictors of dropout, these attitudes do not exert a sta-
tistically significant influence on dropout. The most important factors pre-
dicting dropout are not living with a partner in 1987, being highly educated,
being nonreligious, having a negative feeling about the interview, and having
a negative attitude toward nonmarital relationships. Together, these 28 pre-
dictors are not explaining attrition too well (Cox and Snell R2 = .07), sug-
gesting that individual attrition between 1987 and 1999 is not very selective.
Couple attrition results from the dropout of intact couples from the sam-
ple and from the dissolution of couples extant in 1995. Such attrition is
likely to be selective, because couples who split have not been able to nego-
tiate their disagreements successfully. The selectivity of the couple attrition
between 1995 and 1999 was assessed by comparing the scores of partici-
pants and nonparticipants in 1999 (either resulting from dropout or from
union dissolution) on the main dependent and independent variables of inter-
est. The results of this analysis are presented in the two final columns of
Table 2. Nonparticipating couples are somewhat younger and have fewer
children than couples retained in the sample. In addition, the husbands in cou-
ples who participate in both waves are somewhat more child oriented than
husbands in couples who do not participate in both waves. Thus, our sample
seems to be slightly biased toward more traditionally oriented couples.
Finally, a somewhat different type of selectivity may influence the
analysis of the impact of attitudes on first childbirth. This analysis is
restricted to couples who did not have a child before 1995. Thirty-eight per-
cent of all couples were childless in 1995. It was not a surprising finding
that childless couples hold more egalitarian gender role attitudes and less
favorable parenthood attitudes than couples who already had children in
1995. In addition, the wife in childless couples is employed for more hours
1498 Journal of Family Issues
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and the husband in childless couples contributes more to household tasks
(data not shown). Thus, our analysis illuminates the impact of attitudes on
late childbearing decisions rather than childbearing decisions in general.
Method
To test all hypotheses except those derived from the social drift rule, we
estimate the following regression model (see Kalmijn, 1994):
Y = α + βjXj + βm (Aw + Ah) + βd ½ (Aw − Ah)
In this model, α is the intercept and βj is a vector with effects of the control
variables. The test concentrates on the last part of model, in which Aw rep-
resents the attitudes of the wife, Ah represents the attitudes of the husband,
β
m
is the mean effect of both attitudes, and βd represents the difference
between both attitudes. In this model, the effect of the attitudes of the wife
is equal to βm + ½βd, and the effect of the attitudes of the husband is equal
to βm – ½βd.
If the golden mean hypothesis is correct, then βm ≥ 0 and βd = 0. If βd ≠ 0,
the attitudes of one of the partners are dominant. The direction of βm and βd
determine jointly whether this is the wife or husband. If β
m
> 0, then the
power rule would imply that βd < 0 for all Y variables. The sphere of inter-
est rule would imply that βd < 0 for the labor force participation of females
and βd > 0 for the division of household labor and child care tasks and for
the timing of childbirth. Finally, if βm = 0 and βd = 0, there is no effect of
attitudes on behavior at all.
The social drift hypothesis cannot be tested with the model specified
above. This hypothesis implies that there is no dominance of one of the part-
ners but that the size of the difference between the attitudes of both partners
is decisive. This hypothesis can be tested with the following model:
Y = α + βjXj + βm(Aw + Ah) + βad |(Aw – Ah)|
If βad ≠ 0, the size of the absolute difference in attitudes determines the
decision of the couple, and it is not important which partner has modern or
traditional values.
The division of household labor and child care and the number of working
hours of wives are analyzed by OLS regression analysis. The birth of a first
child is analyzed by a Cox regression model, with the risk period starting
at the moment of interview in 1995 and ending at the moment of childbirth
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within the period 1995 to 1999. For couples who did not have children in this
period, the risk period ends at the time of interview in 1999. Respondents who
already had a first child before 1995 were left out of the analysis. In all models,
we control for the earlier mentioned set of control variables.
Results
Similarity in Attitudes
Information on the level of attitude similarity between spouses is very
limited. Therefore, before studying the impact of attitudes on behavior, we
show some figures on attitude similarity between partners. In Table 3, the
correlations between attitudes of husbands and wives are displayed. The
correlation between husbands and wives for both parenthood attitudes and
gender role attitudes is equally high, namely .34. Evidently, there is some
attitude homogamy, but it is not strong. The correlation between parent-
hood attitudes and gender role attitudes for both husbands and wives is
somewhat lower, namely –.29 for wives and –.25 for husbands.
The Influence of Value Orientations on Joint Decisions
Next, we turn to the impact of spousal attitudes on joint decisions. Table 4
shows the results of the analyses of the influence of attitudes of partners on
childbirth and the division of labor. In Model A, the average effect of attitudes
of both partners is estimated. This model allows us to test whether the atti-
tudes of couples have an impact on their couple-related behavior. In Model
B, the difference in the effect of partners’ attitudes is added to the model. This
model allows us to test whether the golden mean rule, the power rule, or the
sphere of interest rule applies. In the last model, Model C, the effect of the
absolute difference between partners’ attitudes is estimated. This model
allows testing the social drift hypothesis. In our discussion of the results, we
concentrate on the effects of attitudes on the joint decisions and do not pay
attention to the effects of other variables.
The first panel of Table 4 shows the effects of partners’ attitudes on the
division of household tasks. In Model A, no statistically significant effects
of either gender role attitudes or parenthood attitudes are observed, so no
support for the golden mean hypothesis is found. Furthermore, in Model B,
no effects of the difference in attitudes between husbands and wives can be
observed either, implying that no support for the power rule or the sphere
of interest rule is apparent, either. Finally, the social drift rule is tested in
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Model C. Here, a statistically significant effect of the absolute difference
between husbands and wives in parenthood attitudes on the division of
household tasks is observed. If husband and wife differ in their parenthood
attitudes, the contribution of the husband to household chores is lower than
if they do not differ in their attitudes. This result seems to support the social
drift hypothesis.1
In the second panel of Table 4, the effects of partners’ attitudes on the
division of caring tasks are reported. In Model A, a clear effect of gender
role attitudes of both partners is observed. As both partners hold more egal-
itarian gender role attitudes, husbands contribute more to caring tasks. In
Model B, no significant effect of the difference between husbands and wives
in attitudes is found. And finally, in Model C, the absolute difference in
attitudes of a couple has no influence on the division of caring tasks, either.
These results support the golden mean hypothesis: Attitudes of both partners
play an equally important role in decisions on the division of caring tasks.
In the next panel of Table 4, the results of effects of partners’ attitudes on
the hours spent by the wife on paid labor are presented. Here, we see no sig-
nificant effects of gender role attitudes of partners. However, we observe a
significant effect of partners’ parenthood attitudes. The number of hours that
a wife spends on paid labor declines as the average attitude of both partners
toward parenthood become more positive. These effects are net of the actual
effect of having children on the labor force participation of wives. There is no
significant difference in the effect of husbands or wives, as can be concluded
from the statistically nonsignificant effect for the difference score in Model
B. The absolute difference in attitudes between husbands and wives has no
Jansen, Liefbroer / Childbirth and Division of Labor 1501
Table 3
Correlation Between Gender Role Attitudes and
Parenthood Attitudes of Husbands and Wives
Child-Oriented Child-Oriented Egalitarian Gender
Attitude of Attitude of Role Attitude
the Wife the Husband of the Wife
Child-oriented attitude .34
of the husband
Egalitarian gender role –.29 –.15
attitude of the wife
Egalitarian gender role –.14 –.25 .34
attitude of the husband
(text continues on p. 1506)
 distribution.
© 2006 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































© 2006 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































© 2006 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































© 2006 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized
























































































































































































































































































© 2006 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized
 at University of Groningen on February 28, 2008 http://jfi.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
effect on the hours of paid labor of wives, either. Therefore, the attitudes of
both partners seem to matter in deciding the number of hours spent on paid
labor by the wife, supporting the golden mean hypothesis.
The last panel of Table 4 shows the results for the effects on the timing
of first childbirth. The results give no evidence for an effect of gender role
attitudes of partners. However, there is an effect of partners’ parenthood
attitudes on childbirth; couples experience the birth of a first child earlier
when they hold more positive attitudes toward children. In Model B, we
see no significant difference in the effect for husbands and wives. There
appears to be no dominance of the parenthood attitudes of one of the part-
ners. Furthermore, there is no effect of the absolute difference in attitudes
between husbands and wives on childbirth. This means that an increasing
difference in attitudes between husbands and wives has no consequences
for the timing of childbirth. From these models, we can conclude that for
first childbirth, the parenthood attitudes of both partners matter and in the
same degree. This result also lends support to the golden mean hypothesis.
Conclusion and Discussion
In this study, we examined the influence of attitudes of both partners on
joint decisions of a couple. Two types of attitudes have been studied—namely,
gender role attitudes and parenthood attitudes. First, we examined to what
extent attitudes of partners show similarities. Next, we investigated the influ-
ence of both partners’ attitudes on first childbirth, the division of household
tasks, the division of caring tasks, and the division of paid labor. The central
question was about which partner has the largest influence on joint decisions.
Four possible heuristics or decision rules are sketched for couples with
dissimilar values to arrive at joint decisions. The first decision rule is based
on the assumption that husbands have the strongest bargaining position,
because of the fact that they have easier access to socioeconomic resources
than wives do. Therefore, husbands hold more power within the relationship,
and this leads to a dominance of husbands’ attitudes (power rule). The second
heuristic is based on the egalitarian assumption that attitudes of both partners
are of equal importance for joint decisions. Following this reasoning, the
behavioral outcome for couples with dissimilar attitudes will lie between the
behavior of homogeneous traditional couples and homogeneous modern cou-
ples (golden mean rule). The third heuristic is derived from the New Home
Economics Theory and suggests that each partner has his or her own life
domain in which he or she has key responsibilities and decision authority
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(sphere of interest rule). Finally, a fourth possibility is discussed—namely,
that dissimilar values lead to avoiding decisions. The division of tasks will
then stay traditional and childbirth will be postponed (social drift rule).
A first important result of our study is that attitude homogamy between
partners is not complete. Both for gender role attitudes and for parenthood
attitudes, we observe a positive but not very high correlation. Nevertheless,
differences between attitudes of husband and wife are relatively modest.
Within couples, the wife’s gender role attitude is often a bit more egalitar-
ian than that of her husband. For parenthood attitudes, we see that differ-
ences work both ways. The proportion of couples in which the wife holds
a more favorable attitude toward parenthood is about equal to the propor-
tion of couples in which the husband holds a more favorable attitude.
For most joint decisions (division of paid labor, division of caring tasks,
and first childbirth), we found evidence that the golden mean decision rule
is operative. Apparently, attitudes of both partners play an equally important
role in decision making about these issues. These results correspond with the
studies on the role of intentions and desires of both partners in childbirth
decisions. Several studies show that the intentions of both partners play an
equal role in the decision to have a child (Thomson, 1997; Thomson &
Hoem, 1998; Thomson et al., 1990). Couples appear to strive toward consen-
sus when they have dissimilar attitudes, and as a result, their behavior lies
somewhere in the middle. Contemporary households have become bargain-
ing households, in which partners have an equal influence on joint decisions.
This result confirms results of studies on conflict and negotiation in house-
holds: Dealing with differences by bargaining and by reciprocity is an impor-
tant decision-making strategy for spouses with different interests (Kluwer
et al., 1997). Bargaining thus seems to belong to the very essence of modern
conjugal relationships.
However, our study also hints at the fact that bargaining does not consti-
tute the rule in all situations. In one of our four analyses, we found support
for the so-called social drift heuristic. Husbands and wives who hold differ-
ent parenthood attitudes seem to have difficulty in striking a balance as far
as the division of household tasks is concerned. Couples with heterogamous
attitudes stick to a more traditional division of the household tasks, irrespec-
tive of which partner is the more child-oriented one. This may result from the
fact that many couples started from a fairly traditional division of labor. If the
wife holds modern parenthood attitudes and the husband is more traditional,
the latter may nevertheless simply refuse to take on a larger share of the
household chores himself. If the wife holds more traditional parenthood atti-
tudes, changing the division of household chores may even be more difficult,
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as the wife has an incentive to stick to the traditional division of labor (“she
wants to be a good housewife and mother”), whereas the husband has little
incentive to change the division of household labor (i.e., it would result in an
increasing workload and less appreciation by his wife). It might be that the
golden mean heuristic does not work in a situation in which one of the
partners experiences only a limited incentive to change the current situation,
whereas the other partner has a strong incentive to retain the status quo. In
such a situation, the social drift rule may apply.
Two types of attitudes have been examined in this study, namely, gender
role attitudes and the parenthood attitudes. The results show clear differences
in the importance of both types of attitudes for behavior. Parenthood attitudes
play an important role in choices concerning childbirth, the division of house-
hold labor, and the number of hours that wives spend on paid labor. Gender
role attitudes only influence the division of child-caring tasks. The fact that
parenthood attitudes are more important than gender role attitudes is some-
what surprising. One reason for the fact that parenthood attitudes generally
exert a stronger effect than gender role attitudes could be that the couples in
this study have been together for a relatively long period of time (a mean union
duration of nearly 12 years). It could be that gender role attitudes are particu-
larly important in deciding on the initial division of labor within the couple.
The more egalitarian the attitudes of both partners, the more equal the division
of household and paid labor between them will be. Later on during the rela-
tionship, having and raising children may ask for adjustments in some aspects
of the existing division of household and paid labor. Given that these adjust-
ments result from the decision to have children, the decision about which of
the partners will adjust his or her behavior most strongly to this new situation
may depend on which partner is the most child-oriented one. At the same time,
having children asks for negotiating one completely new aspect, namely, the
division of child care tasks. Given that no previous arrangements for this type
of labor exist, it could be that gender role attitudes, which provide a script for
the way these tasks should be divided in general, are important in deciding on
this particular aspect of the division of labor within couples.
We want to conclude with some methodological remarks. Our results are
based on a panel survey. Some of the attrition in our panel is related to the
attitudes of couples with regard to gender roles and parenthood. However,
attrition seemed to work in opposite directions, depending on the type of
decision studied. In general, our sample overrepresents rather traditional
couples, because nontraditional couples were somewhat more likely to drop
out from the panel. The opposite is true for the decision to have a first child.
This subsample is somewhat biased toward nontraditional couples. The fact
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that the golden mean rule turned out to be operative in the decision to have
a first child and in most of the other decisions as well suggests that decision
making might not be too different between relatively traditional and rela-
tively nontraditional couples.
We would also like to stress that ours has been a conservative test of the
decision rules. The small number of respondents in our study makes it hard
to find statistically significant results. With a larger number of respondents,
it could have been easier to trace possible patterns in dominance of one of
the partners. In addition, we examine changes in behavior within a relative
short period of time. This short time period may have made it hard to find
statistically significant results. Nevertheless, the fact that we did find support
for some of our hypotheses offers a clear indication for the existence of an
influence of partners’ attitudes on joint decisions. An important avenue for
future research would be to address the question whether our results can be
generalized. It would be interesting to examine the influence of partners’
attitudes on other joint decisions. And it would also be very useful to exam-
ine the connection between partners’ attitudes and their behavior within
other cultures or countries to see whether the balance between partners is
different in another (for instance, more traditional) context.
Note
1. Partners often differ in their reports on the division of household and caring tasks (Kamo,
2000). It could be that the impact of attitudes differs, depending on who is reporting.
Unfortunately, we have information from just one of the partners only and therefore cannot test
for this possibility directly. However, an indirect way to test whether the gender of the reporting
partner influences the estimated impact of attitudes on behavior is by including an interaction
between gender of the respondent and attitudes in the model. We did so, but none of the estimated
interaction effects were found to be statistically significant. Therefore, the effect of attitudes on
behavior does not depend on the gender of the spouse reporting on that specific behavior.
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